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Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: 
What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current financial 
crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National Banking 
Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant for comparison with 
the Panic of 2008.  In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt and the default of railroad 
companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous brokerage houses, an antecedent to 
the modern investment bank.  For the Panic of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals 
centered on the less regulated trust companies, which were less directly linked to the 
existing lender of last resort, similar to investment banks in 2008.  The popular press has 
made numerous references to the banking crises (there were three main ones) of the Great 
Depression as relevant comparisons to the present crisis.  This paper argues that such an 
analogy is inaccurate in general.  Banking crises in US history reflected widespread 
depositor withdrawals whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears.  
The lessons from the past, therefore, appear less directly relevant for the current crisis. 
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I INTRODUCTION  
 
 Three quarters of a century without a dangerous banking crisis in the U.S. is 
testimony of the success with which banking stability was maintained.  Something must 
have changed to have made the existing banking structure unsustainable.  And we think 
we know what those changes are.  They are deeply embedded in the evolution of banking 
markets, the size of participant institution and their interconnections, the complexity of 
new financial products traded and the globalization of the financial markets.  The 
cumulative effect of these changes did not become evident until the termination of a 
prolonged and then intense housing bubble, reflecting an overextension of credit toward 
housing.  The nature of systemic risk had changed. Latin American debt, the Savings and 
Loan crisis, and Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) now seem like small potatoes 
in comparison, although the 1981 crisis could have been much worse without government 
intervention on a large scale. 
 In stark contrast to the seventy five years of relative banking stability was the 
sixty years of banking instability between 1873 and 1933: four major banking crises in 
1873, 1893, 1907, and 1914 and three banking panics in 1930 and 1931.  And then there 
was the complete collapse of the banking system in March 1933.  What, indeed, is 
anomalous is that the U.S. established a central bank, the Federal Reserve System, in 
1913 in part to prevent a recurrence of the national banking era crises and yet the worst 
banking crises occurred in 1930 and 1931.  The banking acts of 1933 and of 1935 and the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 were designed to prevent a recurrence of the 
banking panics of the Great Depression.  The legislation had been successful in 
preventing banking panics like those that occurred during the Great Depression.  But the 
4 
 
current crisis bears little or no resemblance to the banking disturbances of the Great 
Depression.  And the difference, we suspect, arises from a distinction of the sources of 
the crises, and an isolation of different conceptions of systemic risk.   
Defining Systemic Risk in the Presence of “Too Big to Fail” Institutions 
 The key to understanding the origin of financial crises resides in the concept 
“systemic risk.”  We define systemic risk as the risk associated with the transmission of a 
financial shock – that is, how an initial shock gets diffused throughout the financial 
system.  Systemic risk implies that the initial financial shock is persistent as it is 
transmitted throughout the financial system.1 
 The loss of depositor confidence in banks has been portrayed as an irrational 
response to an information deficit about individual bank solvency.  The word “panic” as 
defined in the dictionary refers to “a sudden, unreasoning hysterical fear often spreading 
rapidly.“   Contagion, however, need not be confined to an irrational response.  
Depositors may be rationally seeking information otherwise not available, resulting in a 
long line of information seekers. 
 Loss of depositor confidence in the solvency of the banking system is one 
example of systemic risk.  A bank run is a response by depositors to an information gap 
concerning either liquidity or solvency (or both) to an individual bank.  Suppose a long 
line of depositors awaiting their chance to liquidate their deposits forms at a bank; the 
existence of the line may generate fear and uncertainty about the financial status of that 
bank among the depositors of other banks.   If that observation leads to bank runs on 
other banks for just that reason – that a depositor thinks “other banks are suffering runs, 
                                                 
1 Persistence may imply “correlation” and “connectedness” of financial institutions in ways that spread the 
financial shock throughout the system.  See Lo 2008. 
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so maybe I should remove my deposits from my bank” – then the subsequent banking 
crisis would be an observation of contagion-based systemic risk. A bank run creates 
systemic risk transmitted through the banking system via contagious bank runs. 
Depositors may lose confidence in banking firms and engage in runs on the banks.  The 
demandable liabilities held by depositors create the danger that banks may have 
insufficient liquid assets to satisfy depositor demands.  Widespread liquidation risk is the 
source of the type of banking panic that arose during the National Banking Era of the 
United States. 
 A second source of systemic risk is the loss of confidence of banks in each other, 
referred to as counterparty risk.  The possibility that banks may lose confidence in each 
other lends substance to the “too big to fail” doctrine.  The policy that some banks are 
“too big to fail” also implies that policy makers fear allowing an insolvent institution to 
fail will impose negative external effects on other intermediaries and risk further financial 
contraction.  The policymaker actions reveal another type of systemic risk, but one that 
reflects a different kind of underlying source.  The expression itself suggests that there 
may be undesirable repercussions to follow if a mega-bank – here, referred to as a large 
complex financial institution (LCFI) is allowed to fail.  The repercussions are often 
described in general terms – either additional bank suspensions or severe impairment of 
the credit markets, or both.  When an LCFI faces insolvency or the threat of insolvency, a 
network of interbank connections may endanger the solvency of other banks with whom 
it is connected.2   
                                                 
2 Flannery 2009 describes how governments had apparently no choice but to support potentially insolvent 
financial institutions during the 2007-2009 crisis. 
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 We have just experienced a banking crisis in which intermediaries lost confidence 
in the solvency of other intermediaries.  In such a setting, a bank failure may pose a threat 
to other banks when the bank in difficulty is heavily indebted to other banking 
intermediaries.  It is especially problematic if that indebtedness is in short-term credit 
instruments. The origins of a financial crisis arise from these interconnections between 
financial intermediaries. The difference between the current financial crisis and those that 
preceded it is the increasing importance attached to the second kind of systemic risk.   
 Interbank connections have been an element of bank disturbances throughout US 
history.  Some banks have always been linked through the holding of correspondent bank 
balances and when the lead bank fails its correspondents are vulnerable as well.3  In 
earlier periods the second source of systemic risk, the interconnections between banks, 
was confined to correspondent relationships, holding company affiliates and chain 
banking networks.  But the network of correspondent balances never bore responsibility 
for generating a panic, even if it contributed to its severity.  What is new about the current 
crisis is the more recent growth in bank size, the willingness to fund off-balance sheet, 
and the increasing sophistication of new financial products. These new financial products 
allow LCFIs to create private contracts through which the contracting parties can 
generate exposures to loss from a small group of counterparties that may ultimately 
justify “too big to fail” actions of policymakers. We will need to wait for data and 
evidence of bank balance sheets to uncover the answer. 
 The complexity of the contracts – residential mortgage-backed securities, 
collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, etc. – contributed to valuation 
                                                 
3 The effects of the correspondent banking system during panics suggest that it may have been more of a 
mechanism for transmitting disturbances as opposed to an ultimate source of crisis.   
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difficulties, namely how problems among subprime mortgage assets – rising defaults and 
foreclosure rates -- would affect the value of the structured investment securities (asset-
backed securities) that were rated as AAA.  But that complexity itself did not introduce 
anything new to the underlying source of the crisis.  The complex derivative contracts 
and structured financial contracts were vehicles through which credit was extended to 
home mortgage borrowers. Still, the underlying problem – excessive credit – is the most 
important basic component of the financial crisis.  Instead, contract complexity re-
introduced and magnified opacity of investment value, and exacerbated the asymmetry of 
information between borrower and lender (the value of the asset as investment and the 
underlying probability that the borrowers will repay the loan [see Gorton 2009]).   
 The first casualties in the current crisis were the investment banks, many of which 
were the largest producers of the mortgage-backed securities that suffered the sharp value 
declines.  Many informative articles examine in detail the crisis of 2007-2009, and so the 
description in this article will focus more attention to historical antecedents, both in terms 
of the market and economic conditions that sparked a financial crisis and the responses 
by market participants and public authorities to the events. 
 The balance sheets of LCFIs post many numbers that presently reflect information 
that is less descriptive of its financial condition than in the past as a result of financial 
innovations.  Bank examinations that take place today are less clear cut; the extensive use 
of derivative contracts and off-balance-sheet entities offer bank employees the 
opportunity to put the bank’s solvency at risk with bank management, much less bank 
supervisors, having only limited control on employee actions.4  If a bank is then less 
                                                 
4 See discussions of  Nick Leeson of Barings and of Jerome Kerviel of Societe Generale, 
(http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/31/books/upper-class-twits-made-me-do-it.html 
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aware of its own financial position, why is it not surprising that there was an increase in 
counter-party risk in markets that operate using daily financial through overnight lending 
facilities?   
Gorton (2008, 2009) argues that the overnight repurchase agreement market, often 
associated with the “shadow banking” sector, experienced a panic in a way similar to the 
panics of the National Banking System.  He explains that the overnight repo market often 
used structured financial products, like CDOs of mortgage asset backed securities, as 
collateral. That collateral suffered from opacity of the underlying investment portfolio. 
When subprime mortgages started to default, it was not clear how those defaults would 
affect each CDO, so in a sense it was rational to “run” away from all CDO collateral that 
could include mortgage backed assets.  Gorton claims that response was essentially a 
banking panic with respect to the overnight repurchase agreement market and the shadow 
banking system (see Gorton 2009). 5  Although the abstract concept of opacity applies, 
the remainder of Gorton’s analogy to National Banking Era panics beckons for additional 
support.  The panics of the National Banking Era were intense yet brief; the panics took 
place in the span of a few weeks, and the constraints on financial trade may have lasted as 
long as three months.  In contrast, the panic that Gorton describes took place over a full 
calendar year. The decline in liquidity in the overnight markets started as early as August 
of 2007. Innovative programs offered by the Federal Reserve System (the Treasury 
Securities Lending Facility and the Term Auction Credit Facility are the most direct 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/business/worldbusiness/19iht-socgen.5.10203247.html;). 
5 The haircut (or discounted valuation) on collateral (mainly, asset backed securities) for repos increased 
from virtually none, to 3 percent, to 6 percent, to 20 percent, and to 40 percent over a span of months.  
These actions curtailed the amount of liquidity that the assets to free up by the amount of the haircuts; the 
idea may sound inconsequential, but the overnight repo market was estimated at $12 trillion, so a 40 
percent haircut implies nearly $5 trillion less in liquidity available to the market. 
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examples) worked to add liquidity by increasing the quality of collateral available. 
Further, the solvency of counterparties during the National Banking Era was rarely in 
question; the New York Clearing House and the Chicago Clearing House examined its 
members regularly, and had timely information regarding the balance sheet condition of 
all its members.  Illiquidity was the issue for National Banking Era panics, whereas the 
recent panic appears to be one that reflects more generally the threat of insolvency. 
 Additional issues distinguish the 2008-09 financial crisis and economic downturn 
from those of either the National Banking Era or the Great Depression.  As time passes, 
we are observing the extensive exposure of all banking institutions – large and small – to 
mortgage lending, both commercial and residential, as well as to real estate developers.  
Not only was the subprime mortgage market extended excessive credit, but it looks as if 
real estate lending was excessive at several levels. 
 
II A LOOK AT HISTORY FOR GUIDANCE TODAY 
 The defining characteristic of the banking panic of the national banking era was 
the suspension of cash payment in New York City followed by selected suspensions in 
the interior, usually bringing an end to further bank closures arising from panic related 
withdrawals.6 
 The decision to suspend cash payment was made separately by local clearing 
house bank associations; it could be either partial or complete.  If partial, then individual 
banks might pay up to a specific amount in cash (usually $50 or $100).  Also, New York 
City banks might restrict payment to individual depositors while still making 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 1 National Banking Era Institutions for more information. 
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discretionary payments to the interior.  Initiative for the country as a whole originated 
with the New York Clearing House.  
 Sprague identified four proximate effects of the suspension of cash payment:  1) 
payroll difficulties, 2) dislocation of domestic exchanges, 3) the increase in hoarding of 
cash, and 4) the emergence of a currency premium.  The immediate impact of the 
suspension of cash payment was partial disruption of the payments mechanism, which 
increased real transactions costs.  Wages were paid in currency; and if business firms 
experienced difficulty in obtaining currency there might have been temporary closings, 
layoffs and the creation of innovative currency substitutes.  The domestic exchanges were 
also disrupted because bankers were reluctant to make out of town remittances.  The 
existence of a currency premium was an added incentive not to deposit currency in banks. 
 Neither bank runs nor bank failure was the way most people experienced a 
banking crisis.  The number of bank suspensions was relatively small both in New York 
City and in the interior, except in 1893.  Table 1 shows the estimated total number of 
bank suspensions in New York and the interior in each of the three major panics of the 
national banking era. 
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Table 1.1 Bank Suspensions in New York City and the interior 
during Banking Panics: 1873-1907 
Source: Wicker (2000) 
  New York 
City 
Interior Total 
1873  37 64 101 
September     
     
1884  15 27 42 
May     
     
1890  10 8 18 
November     
     
1893  3 500 503 
(May-August)     
     
1907  13 60 73 
(October-
December)     
Table 1.2  Percentage of total bank suspensions to total number of banks in 
each of the Banking Panics of the national banking era and the Great 
Depression 
National Banking Era  Great Depression 
   
Panic Percent  Panic Percent 
     
1873* N.A. 1930 0.034 
1884 0.006  1931(I) 0.0295 
1890 0.0015  1931(II) 0.0427 
1893 0.042   
1907 0.0026    
     
*The percentage of state and national bank suspensions of total number of 
state and national banks was 0.0165 in 1873; Wicker (2000) had not 
uncovered estimates of total number of unincorporated banks in 1873. 
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 Another measure of bank panic severity is the percentage of bank suspensions 
relative to the total number of banks.  The percentages are set out in Table 1.2 for each of 
the banking panics except 1873.7  It is quite clear that the panics of the national banking 
era had less serious failure outcomes than the Great Depression, the single exception 
being 1893.  The ratio fell below 1 percent in 1883, 1890, and 1907.   For the Panic of 
1893, the ratio was 4.3 percent, the same as the second panic of the Great Depression. 
 In 1873 and 1893, issues of clearing house loan certificates preceded the 
suspension of cash payment – four days in 1873 and two weeks in 1893.  These 
initiatives were announced simultaneously in 1907.  Clearing House Loan Certificates 
enabled the member banks to conserve much needed cash by providing an instrument for 
discharging debt at the Clearing House. 
The 1873 Banking Panic 
 We have to go back more than 130 years to identify a speculative boom that 
resulted in a banking crisis.  The 1873 banking panic was caused by the reckless 
expansion of railroad mileage in what was then the western territory.  As railroad 
construction outpaced the freight and passenger demands, railroad defaults struck first the 
investment and brokerage houses that facilitated the credit allocation to the railroads, and 
left numerous European investors with substantial losses.  The initial losses in 1873 
forced the closure of the well-known brokerage of Jay Cooke and Company, along with 
other lesser known but still important brokerage houses.  
 Although not the first to fail, Jay Cooke’s demise on September 18 drew national 
and international attention. According to Henrietta Larson, Cooke’s biographer (1964, 64) 
the firm was overloaded with weak investments and advances made to specific railroads 
                                                 
7 We have no estimate of the number of unincorporated banks for that year.   
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including Northern Pacific.  She thought the ensuing panic marked an important phase of 
American business, that is, “the speculative promotion of railroads beyond a reasonable 
expectation of returns under the drive of postwar conditions.”  The closing of Cooke’s 
affiliates in Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia brought pandemonium to New York City, 
where stock prices collapsed.  More than 40 brokerage houses (private banks) failed in 
September in New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. as the result of 
excessive stock market speculation.  The closed brokerage houses, the predecessor of the 
investment bank, were the institutions that suffered most directly from the railroad losses.  
Over time, the losses filtered down into the banking system because many banks lent 
directly to railroads, and the railroad losses had knock on effects on peripheral 
businesses, many of which borrowed from banks. For the country as a whole, brokerage 
houses account for about 60 percent of total suspensions.  Only one national bank and 
two trust companies failed in New York City.  The loss of depositor confidence was 
confined to the savings banks all of which suffered runs. Loss of depositor confidence in 
the interior was greatest in Chicago.  But banking unrest extended to Memphis and all 
along the Atlantic coast from Petersburg, Virginia to Savannah, Georgia. 
 The New York Clearing House responded to the banking crisis of 1873 by pooling 
bank reserves and the issue of clearing house loan certificates.  Unlike the response to 
crises in 1860 and 1861, reserve pooling did not deter the New York Clearing House from 
suspending cash payment. Although cash reserves had fallen to an extremely low level, it 
is still debatable whether suspension was necessary.8  We have no direct measures of cash 
hoarding, but we have the specie and legal tender totals for New York City national 
                                                 
8 We do not have monthly estimates of hoarding for 1873. 
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banks.  In the first week of September 1873, legal tender and specie was over $67 
million; by the week of October 20, those reserves dwindled to $19 million. The threat of 
falling to zero was non-trivial. 
 Contemporaries described the post panic years as “of gloom and depression.”  The 
qualitative evidence is insufficient to verify that claim.  Unemployment estimates do not 
begin before 1890.  We only have annual GNP estimates for 1873 and afterwards.  We 
know that annual estimates may smooth the quarterly figures.  Romer (1988) provides 
estimates of real GNP indicating that real GNP was increasing between 1873 and 1875.  
Annual estimates of industrial production by Joseph Davis (2004) suggest that the 
contraction in 1873 was less severe than previously estimated. Balke and Gordon (1999) 
reveal only a one percent decline in 1873-74, offering little justification for labeling the 
episode a depression.   
Assessment: Common Characteristics of Panics in 1873 and in 2007-2009 
The crisis of 1873 displays several similarities to the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009.  Most notably, the excessive issuance of credit allocated toward railroad finance led 
to the financial crisis in 1873, which resembles the over-issuance of credit allocated 
toward home mortgage finance from 2001 to 2007.  Less obvious, but perhaps nearly as 
important, the source of much of the investment capital in 1873 aimed toward railroad 
expansion came from overseas investors.  Similarly, overseas capital financed a large 
portion of the recent home mortgage credit expansion.  In the recent financial crisis, 
investment capital was transformed into complex and opaque financial claims using 
elaborate extensions of financial contract design.  However, at its basis, the recent 
financial crisis arose from the same basic elements of past crises – excessive lending, 
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increasing leverage, and faulty underwriting of loans. 
The Panic of 1893 
 The 1893 panic stands apart from all other banking panics of the national banking 
era.  Three fourths of all bank suspensions in 1873, 1893 and 1907 occurred in that year.  
They were widely diffused geographically and contraction in quarterly GNP was almost 
as severe as the contraction in the first year of the Great Depression.  There were runs on 
urban banks by fear ridden depositors who were testing bank solvency.  The suspended 
banks that reopened shortly thereafter were probably solvent at the time of closure.  For 
the country as a whole, one in four suspended banks reopened and resumed normal 
operations and had liabilities equal to the same proportion.9  The proportion of reopened 
banks to total suspended differed by region.  One third of suspended banks resumed in 
the Pacific region and slightly more than 36 percent in the Southern region.  In Denver, 
Louisville, and Kansas City the proportion was even higher. 
 The 1893 banking crisis was accompanied by a stock market collapse.  The stock 
market plunged on May 3 and National Cordage failed the next day.   But the weakness in 
National Cordage stock was apparent earlier.  The immediate impact was felt in the 
closing of the brokerage houses, the signature of the 1893 panic, which had been 
speculating in National Cordage stock.  Repercussions were transmitted to the rest of the 
country.  The collapse in depositor confidence was reflected in increased hoarding of 
cash.  Like 1873, we do not have monthly estimates of currency in circulation but we 
have what was effectively the level of bank reserves available to national banks in New 
York City.  In the week of May 15, the New York City national banks held $134 million 
                                                 
9 We have no information regarding the need for capital injections prior to reopening the suspended banks. 
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in specie and legal tender; that total fell to a nadir of $76.5 million by the week of August 
7, 1893. 
 The Balke-Gordon quarterly GNP estimates reveal a decline in real GNP of 14.7 
percent from the fourth quarter of 1892 to the fourth quarter of 1893. This compares with 
a 19 percent decline from the third quarter of 1929 to the fourth quarter of 1930.  Chart 1 
displays the Balke-Gordon real GNP estimates as a proportion of peak real GNP prior to 
the recession/depression.  The contraction of 1893 is the (green) line with the circular 
observation indicators, whereas the Great Depression is the (blue) line with the diamond 
squares.  The contraction following 1893 was sharper than the Great Depression for the 
first three quarters following the peak. There was, however, no severe depression during 
the next four years observable in the real GNP figures, and real GNP had regained the 
peak level of real GNP after nine quarters.  While 1896 was a year of the doldrums when 
real GNP declined by 2.9 percent, thereafter, the economy began to recover. 
 The crisis in banking during the Panic of 1893 took hold mainly in the interior of 
the country.  Although 500 national banks failed during this financial crisis, only three of 
those national banks were New York national banks.  There was little indication of a 
financial crisis in Wall Street; the mild upward spikes in the call loan interest rate (see 
Chart 2) were modest even in comparison to some non-panic periods. Whereas the New 
York City banks supplied currency to the interior during the 1873 crisis, those banks were 
not supplying sufficient currency to the interior in 1893. 
Assessment: The Panic of 1893 and the Current financial Crisis 
 The crisis of 1893 displays few similarities to the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009.  
The financial shock was transmitted through the investment brokerage houses, similar to 
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1873 and the investment banking industry in 2008-09.  The key difference is that the 
2008-09 financial crisis affected the money center, whereas the Panic of 1893 affected 
mostly the interior banking institutions. 
The 1907 Banking Panic 
 The 1907 banking panic had its origins in New York City with relatively little 
effect on the interior of the country with respect to financial distress.  The source of the 
disturbance was trust companies, which were state chartered institutions, and were not 
central to the payments system. New York City national banks were central to the 
payments system, especially the largest ones, and it was that functional difference that set 
up the tension between the trust companies and the commercial banks. Because the trust 
companies were not important players in the payments system, the trust companies in 
New York City as a group chose not to become members of the New York Clearing 
House, even though membership was offered.  The restrictions necessary to join the 
association – one crucial element, a 10 percent cash reserve balance -- were deemed more 
costly than the benefits of membership.  As a result, the trust companies fell outside the 
effective regulatory framework of the New York Clearing House, and when the Panic of 
1907 struck, the trust companies had only indirect access to the clearing house and its 
potential store of liquidity.   
 The National Bank of Commerce announced that it would no longer clear checks 
for the Knickerbocker Trust during the Panic of 1907, an example of a form of 
“counterparty risk” that would not occur between clearing house member banks.   
Prior to its closure on October 22, 1907, the Knickerbocker Trust Company requested 
support from the New York Clearing House, which was rejected.  The main justification 
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for the rejection was that fact that the Knickerbocker Trust was not a member of the New 
York Clearing House.  J.P. Morgan also refused to intervene.  JP Morgan is rightfully 
given credit for organizing the support to bail out the trust companies later in the crisis; it 
is ironic that he was also partly responsible for allowing Knickerbocker Trust to fail. 
 Trust companies and New York City national banks both issued a large proportion 
of loans to the call loan market on the New York Stock Exchange.  It could have been this 
shared credit exposure that finally convinced the New York Clearing House and J.P. 
Morgan to support the Trust Company of America after Knickerbocker Trust failed.  
Loans on call held by New York national banks actually increased during the panic, likely 
reflecting a transfer of those loans from trust companies.10  The shared exposure to 
investment in an external market was the source of interconnectedness between these two 
different intermediary types. 
 In retrospect, the decision to allow Knickerbocker Trust to fail appears to have 
been a mistake; by 1907, the New York City trust companies in aggregate had total assets 
and deposits that rivaled the aggregate assets and deposits of New York City national 
banks.  The 1907 panic is notable for its relative lack of national bank failures along with 
relatively stable national bank loan and deposit figures for New York City banks.  These 
statistics hide the substantial contraction in trust company deposits and loans in New 
York City (over 30 percent), which suggests that net credit to the economy contracted 
along with the contraction in real output. 
 Real GNP declined 12 percent between the 2nd quarter of 1907 and the first 
quarter of 1908.  Chart 1 demonstrates that the depth of the contraction in real GNP in the 
1907 business cycle matches the sharp pace of decline in the 1893 contraction.  Further, 
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both these contractions appear to decline more sharply than the initial output contraction 
in the Great Depression.  The financial distress in 1907 was apparent in Chart 2 as the 
Call Money Interest Rate – the rate of interest paid on overnight demand loans made on 
stock market equity collateral – spiked over 20 percent in October 1907, and stayed over 
10 percent for the rest of the year. Cash hoarding, as reflected in the currency to deposits 
ratio, increased notably during the panic.  Chart 3 displays the currency to deposits ratio 
taken relative to the level of that ratio at the beginning of the crisis.  The chart shows that 
the ratio increased by over 10 percent throughout the panic. 
 The New York Clearing House addressed the crisis by restricting the 
convertibility of payments into currency and by issuing Clearing House Loan Certificates 
by over $80 million.  Similar actions taken by clearing houses across the country 
essentially increased the available currency supply for those depositors who demanded 
currency. 
Assessment: The Panic of 1907 and the Current financial Crisis 
 The Panic of 1907 displays a number of similarities to the Financial Crisis of 
2007-2009.   
1)  The 1907 financial crisis centered among the trust companies, not national 
banks.  In the recent financial crisis, investment banks mainly suffered from 
perceptions of counterparty risk as lenders would not renew their loans. 
 
2)  Neither trust companies in 1907 nor investment banks in 2008-09 had direct 
access to the relevant lender of last resort – the New York Clearing House for 
the trust companies in 1907 and the Federal Reserve System for investment 
banks in 2008-09. 
 
3)  Both financial crises highlight the undesirable outcomes arising from uneven 
regulation on competing financial intermediaries. Neither trusts nor modern 
investment banks were important parts of the payment system, yet the crises 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 See Moen and Tallman 1992. 
20 
 
focused on these institutions and put the payment system and component 
institutions at risk nevertheless.  
 
 
The Recession of 1913 and the Financial Crisis of 1914 
 We sketch briefly three aspects of the financial crisis of 1914, although it justifies 
more scholarly attention as a successful policy intervention during a financial panic (see 
Wicker 2005, and Silber 2007).  First, Chart 1 displays the real GNP contraction relative 
to the level of real GNP at the peak of the business cycle (January 1913). We see that the 
rate of real output contraction accelerated notably after the Declaration of War in August 
of 1914.  Chart 3 displays the hoarding of currency following the onset of the financial 
crisis (July 1914), and the degree of hoarding is similar to the degree of hoarding during 
the Panic of 1907.  However, the implementation of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act provision 
for the creation of an emergency currency satisfied the depositor’s withdrawal demands 
without the imposition of restrictions on convertibility of deposits into currency.  On the 
other hand, the New York Stock Exchange was closed from August to November 1914, 
preventing European investors from liquidating investments and exporting gold to the 
Continent (see Silber 2007).  So to some extent another “circuit breaker” was 
implemented during this crisis. 
The Economic Contraction of 1920-21 
 There was no financial panic during the recession of 1920-21, but there was a 
substantial economic contraction.  Chart 1 illustrates how real GNP fell during the 1920-
21 contraction; the box indicators display real GNP in 1920-21 taken relative to its level 
at the peak real GNP level prior to the contraction.  The Chart reveals that this recession, 
after 5 quarters from the previous peak, was the deepest of the five contractions – even 
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deeper than the Great Depression at that point.  Unlike the Great Depression, that five 
quarter mark was the nadir of the real output performance for the 1920-21 recession.  It is 
notable that the Federal Reserve System maintained a substantial level of borrowed 
reserves during the contraction, thereby providing sufficient liquid reserves to the 
banking system.  The Fed fulfilled its role as provider of liquidity during this crisis. 
 A further notable characteristic of the 1920-21 experience is the behavior of the 
currency to deposits ratio, which indicates hoarding of cash and disintermediation.  
Despite the absence of a banking crisis, there appears to be some cash hoarding 
throughout the two years following the business cycle peak (see Chart 4).  It is important 
to note that the degree of hoarding was minimal in comparison to panic hoarding in 1907.  
Banking Panics of the Great Depression 
 We will refer specifically to the three waves of bank suspensions during the Great 
Depression: November-December 1930, January 1931, April-August 1931, and 
September-October 1931.  The banking panics of the Great Depression bear little or no 
resemblance to what happened in 1873, 1893, and 1907.  Nor do they resemble what has 
happened in the current financial crisis. There were multiple crises, or rather a sequence 
of crises, and not a single crisis.  Also the crises of the Great Depression differed in 
origin, severity, and what was done in response by the private market participants and the 
public sector institutions.   
 Post-civil war panics were single episode events whereas there were multiple 
banking crises in 1930 and 1931.  The significance of multiple banking panics resides in 
the fact that there was a progressive and continual deterioration of depositor confidence 
as revealed by Federal Reserve notes in circulation, seasonally adjusted.  During the 1930 
22 
 
and 1931 banking crises, hoarding accelerated during the panic, leveled off at a higher 
plateau and then accelerated again at the onset of a new crisis.  Depositor confidence was 
never restored.  Chart 3 displays how the currency deposits ratio increased after the first 
banking crisis in November 1930, but accelerated dramatically after September 1931, 
more than doubling by February 1932. 
 The fact that 9000 banks failed during the Great Depression vastly exaggerates the 
impact of the three banking panics.  Only 40 percent of the suspended banks were panic 
related.  The remaining 60 percent, no less a problem, were the consequence of the three 
year contraction of output and employment.  These failures were depression related.  
Nevertheless, the panic related suspensions greatly outnumbered those in 1873, 1893, and 
1907.   
 Prior to October 1931, there was no legislative authority for assisting distressed 
banks not related to a banking crisis.  Lender of last resort responsibilities of the Fed 
applied solely to panic related distress (e.g., solvent banks in a liquidity crisis) and to 
member banks of the Federal Reserve System.  The continued increase in panic and non 
panic related bank suspensions led President Hoover in 1931 to propose the establishment 
of a National Credit Corporation, an agency whose purpose would be to lend to solvent 
and illiquid member banks with an inadequate supply of eligible paper to discount at the 
Fed. In early 1932, the agency was transformed into the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC) and was empowered to lend to all banks in need, both solvent and 
insolvent.  The Chairman of the Fed also served as Chairman of the RFC, thereby 
blurring the lender of last resort responsibilities of the Fed. Contributing to bank stability 
in panic free 1932 were numerous loans made by the RFC.  By July, the RFC had made 
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$643 million in loans to 3,600 banks.  There was no further erosion of depositor 
confidence in 1932.   
 The role of the RFC expanded after the banking collapse of March 1933.  The 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation provided capital injections to banks from 1932 
through 1935.  This support for the banking system was not related to banking panics. 
 The RFC purchased the preferred stock in the needy banks. By the end of June 
l934 the RFC owned 23.6 percent of the capital stock, notes and debentures of all insured 
banks. Ultimately, the agency was responsible for acquiring over 25 percent of the capital 
of insured banks.11  It was successful in restoring depositor confidence and forestalling 
future bank failures. But the restructuring of the banking system in 1933 did not increase 
lending at either member or insured banks.  Between October 1933 and November 1935, 
total loans of member banks declined by 9.3 percent.  For all insured banks, the decline 
was 4.4 percent between June 1934 and June 1935.  The massive injection of bank capital 
by the government apparently failed to expand loans.  We may well ask was the injection 
too small or were there other factors as work?12   
 Another distinguishing feature of the banking disturbances of the Great 
Depression was their origin.  National banking era panics (at least 1873 and 1907) had 
their origin in the central money market from which they spread to the interior of the 
country.  During the Great Depression, their origin was the interior.  When the panic 
originated in New York City, it was regarded as of national significance.  When banking 
disturbances originated in the interior, it was far from obvious that they were of national 
importance.   We can look in vain in the pages of the financial press for an event clearly 
                                                 
11 See Studentski and Krooss 1963, page 372. 
12 Calomiris and Wilson (2004) suggest that banks in New York City were capital constrained. Further 
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designated a banking panic.  It was certainly not the name given to the accelerated bank 
suspension in the final two months of 1930 (the first banking panic).  Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) were the first to characterize these suspensions as a banking panic.  
They assigned a causal role to these suspensions to explain why the money stock fell and 
the depression deepened, thereby giving dramatic emphasis to the banking crises.  We did 
not learn of the origin of the first banking crisis (November 1930) until the 1980s when 
John McFerrin’s 1939 book on the southern investment bank of Caldwell and Company 
was rediscovered.  The case for regarding the November and December 1930 bank 
suspensions as purely regional is persuasive.  Recent work by Richardson (2007) 
reinforces this conclusion, and further provides evidence that the causes of bank distress 
during the Great Depression resulted from both insolvency and illiquidity of banks. 
Assessment: The Great Depression Panics and the Current financial Crisis 
 The severity of the financial crisis of the Great Depression is revealed by the 
number of bank suspensions, the increase in hoarding, and a 33 percent decline in the 
money stock, for which there is no equivalent in the current 2008-09 financial crisis.  
Commercial bank suspensions have been minimal in the current crisis.  There has been no 
general loss of depositor confidence.  The money stock has increased substantially as a 
result of action by the Fed.  
 We begin with an abbreviated sketch of the primary difference between the 
present financial situation and the multiple crises of the Great Depression.  The current 
financial crisis bears little resemblance to what happened initially in 1930 and 1931.  The 
first two banking panics were similar to the banking panics during the National Banking 
Era because the banks lacked sufficient liquid funds to meet depositor withdrawals. 
                                                                                                                                                 
investigation of this important issue seems warranted. 
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Widespread deposit withdrawals from banks resulted from a contagious run on the banks.  
Recent evidence in Richardson (2007) confirms that many banks that closed as a result of 
these runs were only in suspension temporarily.  These banks were not insolvent; the 
panic could have been managed with standard central banking principles as suggested by 
Bagehot's rule – lend freely and at a high penalty rate. The Federal Reserve policy makers 
left the rule to be applied at the discretion of individual reserve banks and the 
consequence was an inordinate number of bank suspensions. 
 By the latter half of the 1929-33 financial crises, bank insolvency finally played 
an important role in accounting for bank suspensions from banking panics.  By that time, 
the deepening depression began to take its toll – loan contraction (are we side-stepping 
whether they were loan defaults?  [Aside: Would a loan recalled be the same thing for our 
purpose?] and security (asset) depreciation combined to threaten the solvency of many 
banks.  Again, Richardson's findings concur with Wicker regarding the importance of 
contagious bank runs during the initial period.  In 1930, the first banking panic was 
triggered by the failure of Caldwell and Company of Nashville, Tennessee and the banks 
in its correspondent banking system.   
Six characteristics distinguish the 1929-33 banking disturbances from the current crisis: 
1. There was no major banking disturbance or banking panic in the central money 
market (Wall Street, New York City) between 1929 and 1933.  The markets remained 
calm and stable even after the collapse of one of the largest banks in the country – The 
Bank of United States – in December 1930.  Wall Street is clearly the locus of the current 
crisis, as it was in 1907 and other National Banking Era (1863-1913) crises prior to the 
creation of the Federal Reserve System. [I think 1873 is best example.] 
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2. Banking panics of the Great Depression had their origin in the interior of the 
country and were region specific.  Below, we'll discuss the first panic and the influence of 
the failure of Caldwell and Company on the contagious runs.  There was no nationwide 
banking panic in 1930 or during the first half of 1931. 
3. Hoarding, as measured by an increase in the currency-deposit ratio, was the 
telltale characteristic of banking panics of the Great Depression beginning with the first 
one.  The increase in the currency-deposit ratio was an important determinant of the 
money stock, a fact at the root of the Friedman-Schwartz narrative.  Each successive 
banking panic raised the amount of currency hoarded to a new and higher plateau.  When 
a panic subsided, currency in circulation failed to return to its pre-panic level.  Depositor 
confidence continued to deteriorate.  Currency in circulation seasonally adjusted 
increased by $270 million between October 1930 and January of 1931.  Chart 3 displays 
the currency to deposit ratios taken relative to the ratios at the beginning of three 
financial crises: October 1907, July 1914, and November of 1930.  Although hoarding 
increases more sharply in both 1907 and 1914, those peaks are dwarfed as the continual 
increase in hoarding as the Great Depression continued.  
So far in this crisis, there has been no increase in hoarding and no obvious loss of 
depositor confidence in the banking system.  The base money stock (high powered 
money) has increased by $1 trillion (an increase of 100 %)  
4. Fed policymakers acknowledged only limited responsibility for preventing 
widespread bank suspensions during the Great Depression.  Bank suspensions were 
region specific and the response to these instances was left to the individual Reserve 
Banks to serve the banks in their districts.  The policies were thereby idiosyncratic – there 
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was an obvious difference for example between the St. Louis District (eighth) and the 
Atlanta District (sixth) towards supplying liquidity to banks in their jurisdiction.  The 
Atlanta Bank promoted liquidity provision and experienced a notably lower failure rate 
among banks in the portion of Mississippi that it serviced than the St. Louis District 
showed for its banks in Mississippi. In 1932, the Open Market Investment Committee 
approved a program of $1 billion purchases of government securities, but purchases were 
discontinued when it was perceived that banks were accumulating excess reserves.   
 The Fed presided over a massive, 33 percent contraction in the money stock (see 
Chart 5). Their policy focus concentrated on the nominal interest rate, not the real interest 
rate – along with the level of discount window borrowings.  They did not assume 
responsibility to prevent the closure of non-member banks.  Also, the discount window 
was constrained to require “eligible paper” for extending credit. 
 In this crisis, Fed policymakers have responded in vigorous and imaginative ways.  
They have asserted their leadership in the crisis by finding creative ways to issue more 
liquid assets for illiquid assets. But as the crisis turned into a concern about the solvency 
of the banking system, Fed policies were unable to stem those losses.  
5. The Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 separated commercial and investment banking 
after which investment banks fell outside the regulatory orbit of the bank regulators.  The 
banking crisis of 2008 was primarily an investment banking crisis, which included 
Bear-Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill-Lynch, along with AIG, Citibank and its 
investment banking subsidiaries.  Even stalwarts GoldmanSachs and Morgan Stanley 
have now changed to a bank holding company charter. 
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6. The so-called banking panics of the Great Depression, it may be surprising to 
learn, went largely unheralded.  No dramatic headlines in leading newspapers.  Even 
historians did not note the banking panics of the Great Depression – except the Bank 
Holiday of 1933.  Of course, bank closings were noted, but not always on a national 
basis.  And the words “banking panic” were not applied to the three episodes.  The label 
Banking Panics was first used by Friedman and Schwartz in their Monetary History.  And 
historians of the period did not use the term to apply to the three waves of bank 
suspensions.  
Common characteristics of the Current Crisis with the Great Depression 
 We turn now from the differences to the similarities between the current crisis and 
the Great Depression. There is at least one that has particular relevance to the current 
crisis. At the time of Roosevelt's inauguration on March 4, l933 the banking system of the 
U.S. had virtually collapsed.  Banks had closed their doors in 33 states; deposit 
restrictions were in effect in 10, and optional closing in 5.  He merely recognized the 
existing situation by declaring a nationwide bank holiday on March 6. A bank holiday 
was a legal artifice for closing the banks without compromising their solvency. It was not 
a new device; it had been used in 5 states during the panic of l907. The Emergency 
Banking Act granted the government the necessary power to reopen the banks at the sole 
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. The government had agreed to guarantee the 
soundness of each of the reopened banks. Only one-half of the nation's banks were 
permitted to reopen in March. Licenses to reopen were completed by April 12 at which 
time 13000 banks had reopened with deposits of $31 billion and 4215 permanently closed 
with deposits of $4 billion.  
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IV A NEW CHALLENGE: WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US 
 The current crisis resembles previous banking panics in as much as its source is to 
be found in the collapse of a large insolvent (investment) financial intermediary – 
Lehman Brothers.  This panic accelerated just as prior panics took turns for the worse 
after a large intermediary failure: Jay Cooke and Co. in September 1873, Knickerbocker 
Trust in October 1907, and Caldwell and Company in November 1930 or (arguably) the 
Bank of United States in December 1930.  In these antecedents, the crisis spread to the 
interior affecting solvent banks as well but the channels of transmission were different.  
In the National Banking Era crises, the suspension of convertibility made interior bank 
deposits held in New York City national banks temporarily inaccessible creating a 
liquidity problem for some banks.  But for the case of the Great Depression, the 
contagion effects were transmitted to interior correspondent banks mainly through 
liquidity channels – i.e., inability to access liquidity in the form of deposits with a failed 
correspondent.  In contrast, the current financial disturbance is different; the unrest seems 
to be mainly confined to the largest investment banks, commercial banks, and nonbank 
financial institutions, having virtually no effects on retail depositor confidence or on 
hoarding.  FDIC took away the incentives for depositors to run banks.  
 A major departure from past practice in quelling financial crises is the 
acknowledgement that megabanks -- large complex financial institutions (LCFIs) and 
other mega financial institutions -- large complex nonbank financial institutions 
(LCNFIs) -- may warrant support even if they are insolvent or at least face a real chance 
of insolvency.  The failure of Lehman Brothers – and more dramatically in the bail out of 
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American International Group (AIG) – demonstrates that the interconnections between 
large intermediaries in the current crisis have substantial bearing on the solvency of 
counterparties.13 
 There is an explicit doctrine known as “too big to fail” that has received 
widespread attention in the banking literature as well as the public policy literature.14  In 
the analysis of recent crises, several researchers have examined whether the protection of 
creditors of large financial institutions has limited the spread of financial distress at the 
expense of the public sector balance sheet and of increased moral hazard going forward.  
The most contentious issues surrounding “too big to fail” are those related to the 
measurement of the probable transmission from the failure of a large bank to other 
institutions and the financial markets in general.  Spillovers can be considered a measure 
of systemic risk, namely the cost to the financial system (and the economy more 
generally) of the failure of a LFCI or LFNCI.15 
 Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, Ben Bernanke, has stated publicly that 
he perceived the bankruptcy of AIG, which wrote credit default swaps on about $75 
billion of AAA-subprime mortgage backed securities, would have caused the failure of 
several important LFCIs overseas as well as in the US.16  The perceived 
interconnectedness of bank balance sheets far exceeds the degree of interconnectedness 
that was observed throughout past crises, and the magnification of credit exposure may 
be due largely to the use of off-balance sheet items in the form of financial derivatives.  
                                                 
13 Lewis 2009 describes the operations of American International Group Financial Products and the 
developments that led to the massive government bailout. 
14 See Gup 2004, Stern and Feldman 2004. 
15 Stern and Feldman 2004 propose that the compelling motivation for policymakers to engage in “too big 
to fail” policies is to avoid the consequences of potentially costly “spillover” effects passing from the 
failure of one large banking organization to the financial market in general. 
16 Bernanke Town Meeting, July 26, 2009. 
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Managing Systemic Risk 
 The key to eliminating banking crises lies in the management of systemic risk.   
Type I systemic risk is reflected in a sudden and unexpected loss of depositor confidence, 
leading to a widespread run on banks resulting in bank suspensions.  The classic remedy 
proposed by Bagehot (1885) was for the central bank to inject reserves by lending freely 
to solvent banks at a high (penalty) rate.  He recognized that the policy might fail for lack 
of resources but the alternative was the breakdown of the banking system, which was 
worse.  So here we have a situation in which a shock occurs, bank depositors infer a 
shock has reduced the value of banking system assets to a degree that threatens the 
solvency of the system.  Bank depositors make the reasonable inference that it is safer to 
remove their deposits from the banking system before they get caught holding 
depreciated claims on the assets of the failed bank.  The information gap between 
depositor and the bank results from the obscurity of asset valuation; it is part of the 
depositor relationship with the bank.  
 The Banking Acts of 1935 created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) with the authority to guarantee within bounds bank deposits.  Depositor 
confidence would respond if the FDIC was credible.  And there have been no national or 
regional banking panics of this type since 1935.  We can conclude that type one systemic 
risk has been successfully managed without recurrence of destabilizing bank runs. 
 Type two systemic risk is a different matter.  It was late in coming to prominence, 
and we are still identifying and learning to respond to it much less managing it.  But it 
was already clear that managing systemic risk required enlarged responsibilities for the 
Federal Reserve System and a new regulatory framework for keeping track of derivative 
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trading (e.g., a clearing house or an exchange, or both, and some means to measure 
volume of contracts outstanding).  It may also be necessary to reduce the aggregate size 
of megabanks (LCFIs).  It is too early to know which path bank regulatory reform will 
follow.  More must be revealed about the nature of systemic risk arising from the ‘too big 
to fail’ doctrine applied to large complex financial intermediaries. This kind of systemic 
risk reflects counterparty risk – that is, the risk of making transactions with other banks.  
This is a loss of confidence between banks (and other intermediaries). But also type two 
systemic risk implies that the credit exposures between intermediaries may be large 
enough such that the failure of one institution may threaten insolvency of one or more 
LFCIs. 
 Voluntary membership in the Clearing House organization effectively limited type 
2 systemic risk among members, implying that self-monitoring worked.  Counterparty 
risk arose from outside the membership in 1907. During the National Banking Era, 
membership in the New York Clearing House provided a credible seal of approval for a 
bank. Members were monitored providing internal assurance to other members of credit 
worthiness.  Now, such monitoring is left to the regulatory agency that supervised the 
intermediary type.  Recent experience suggests that substantial regulatory reform is 
necessary. 
Too Big to Fail and the Lack of a Plan 
 There is an explicit doctrine associated with all of the banking panics of the 
National Banking Era and the Great Depression.  Distressed banks were only eligible for 
financial support if the institutions were perceived as solvent.  This doctrine applied to 
support offered by the New York Clearing House, by J.P. Morgan and his associates and 
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the Federal Reserve.  Insolvent banks should be allowed to fail.  Morgan denied aid to the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company in 1907. Neither public nor private entities offered 
support to the Bank of United States in 1930.  Systemic risk either was not associated 
with the insolvency or threat of insolvency of a large (or mega- for its time) bank or the 
risk was regarded as minimal.   
 .  A major departure from past practice is the acknowledgement that the mega 
bank may warrant support even if it is insolvent or it faced a threat of insolvency. 
The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have replaced the “old school” 
doctrine with “too big to fail.”  “Too big to fail” is not new; we have seen it in numerous 
bank failures since the 1970s, including the failure of Continental Illinois National Bank 
and Trust Company in 1984.  At that time, the failure of Continental Illinois was deemed 
too large to declare insolvent and liquidate quickly; the condition of its counterparties 
was among the central reasons for the plan to support the institution (the Federal Reserve 
and the FDIC provided substantial funding to maintain bank operations for a time).17 
 Too big to fail is a euphemism for “fear that systemic risk is too excessive to 
allow failure.”  The belief that the suspension (or failure) of a financial institution will 
expose the financial system to an excessive risk of systemic failure suggests that we are 
dealing with another type of systemic risk.  The systemic risk of the national banking era, 
and even of the Great Depression, was Type I -- one that surrounded the loss of depositor 
confidence, runs on banks, liquidity shortages, and bank suspension.  When such 
financial panics were observed, panics would be symptoms that the banking system 
                                                 
17 The equity shareholders eventually lost their investment, but it was not as rapid as the shareholder losses 
at Washington Mutual in 2008. 
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displayed excessive systemic risk. We may do well to differentiate between the two forms 
of systemic risk.   
 The two types of systemic risk require a different set of responses by the 
authorities to observations of each type.  The Bagehot’s rules represent the standard 
response of the central bank to type one systemic risk: lend freely at a penalty rate (high 
price) to solvent banks.  Injections of liquidity then allay the panic. So on one level the 
current crisis is entirely different from the banking panic episodes from 1929-1933 – the 
current problem is bank insolvency [or the perception or threat of bank insolvency].  
Bagehot's rule does not apply. There are no rules for a central bank to follow about how 
to bail out insolvent banks or whether or not they should be bailed out.  When type two 
systemic risk is prevalent, the remedy lies elsewhere, e.g., shoring up the bank capital, 
removal of the toxic assets from the balance sheet of the insolvent bank, and perhaps 
restricting the size of the banking institution. 
The current crisis 
 The difference between the current financial crisis and those that preceded it is the 
increasing importance attached to the second kind of systemic risk.  In earlier crises, the 
second source of systemic risk, the interconnections between banks, was confined to 
correspondent relationships, holding company affiliates and chain banking networks.  
The nature of interconnectedness was mainly standing deposits at correspondents, and 
loans between banks.  The hub of the financial market was New York City, and trouble at 
the center spread almost instantly to the periphery in most cases.   
 In the current crisis, systemic risk has been magnified by the existence of LCFIs -- 
megabanks with more sophisticated and complex interconnections – and the complicated 
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contracts that comprise structured financial products.  Contract exposures, like Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS), allegedly caused some intermediaries to be more virulent 
“liabilities” to the financial system if they failed than if they continued as ongoing 
entities.  Hence, capital injections by the government were deemed a preferable path of 
action than failure and liquidation.  The insolvency or threatened insolvency of a 
megabank has given rise to the doctrine of “too big to fail” signaling excessive systemic 
risk from such a failure.  The old doctrine described above – ‘let insolvent banks fail’ – 
prevailed prior to World War II. Restoring financial system integrity in the current setting 
requires actions to improve perceptions of bank solvency -- a markedly different solution 
from restoring liquidity.  
 Because of the unwise investments in complex financial structures driven by 
questionable assets, certain investment banking houses (and large and complex financial 
institutions like Citigroup and Merrill Lynch) were threatened with insolvency.   These 
LCFIs or mega banks were excessively leveraged, which is really the crux of the 
systemic risk. When the asset values declined precipitously, the LCFIs were having 
difficulty in refinancing their speculative operations.  In fact, banks lost confidence in 
each other.  The banks simply stopped lending after the failure of Lehman Brothers; the 
commercial paper market essentially shut down.  There was a credit blockade. 
 The fundamental problem was one of insolvency or threatened insolvency, a 
problem to which conventional central bank policies had no answers.  Bagehot’s rules 
spelled out how a central bank should respond to a panic generated by a loss of depositor 
confidence: lend freely to solvent banks at a penalty rate.  But insolvent banks get no 
loans.  In 1933-35, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) made large injections 
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of capital into banks, but presumably only to solvent banks.  Even in the national banking 
Era, the New York Clearing House was supposed to give support to its member banks, 
but only if they were solvent. 
 “Old school” central banking acknowledged that insolvent banks, if it could be 
shown that it was insolvent, should be allowed to fail.  The tremendous growth in bank 
size and increased complexity of interconnectedness among bank balance sheets of large 
institutions have subjected the “let insolvent banks fail” doctrine to serious question. So 
on one level the current crisis is entirely different from the banking panic episodes from 
1929-1933 – the current problem is bank insolvency [or the perception or threat of bank 
insolvency].  Bagehot's rule does not apply. There are no rules for a central bank to 
follow about how to bail out insolvent banks or whether or not they should be bailed out.   
 
V SUMMARY AND PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 We have had eight major banking crises in 137 years. Four of these occurred 
during the national banking era and three during the Great Depression. And then we have 
the current financial crisis.  Banking instability characterized the first 60 years.  The last 
75 years have been stable with the only exception being the current crisis, that is, if we 
treat the Savings and Loan debacle separately.  This fact alone should be occasion for 
surprise.  What could have changed in more recent years to have abruptly interrupted this 
long interval when a banking crisis has been absent? 
 Major changes in the structure of the U. S. banking system have increased its 
vulnerability to banking crises.  First, bank consolidation has produced a small number of 
mega banks controlling a disproportionate share of total U. S. banking resources.  
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Second, there has been an explosion in the creation of new and highly complex bank 
products, which may obfuscate a bank’s financial exposure implied by the contracts. 
Third, the globalization of banking markets has magnified the interconnections between 
large banking and bank-like institutions across borders, requiring greater coordination 
among central banks and regulatory agencies worldwide. 
 We found the origin of banking disturbances in the existence of systemic risk, and 
we have identified two broad classifications of those risks: type one characterized by runs 
on banks and type two involving counter-party interconnections and encompassed by the 
“too big to fail” doctrine.  Banking panics of the National Banking Era and the Great 
Depression exhibit a predominance of “type one” systemic risk. The banking system 
suffered a shock in the form of a loss of depositor confidence.  Depositors then ran the 
banks.  Banks that were unable to meet depositor demands were forced to suspend; bank 
failures accelerated; hoarding of cash outside the banking system increased, and the 
money supply contracted.  Further, industrial production and real GDP contacted as well.  
This is a thumbnail description of what happened in the banking panics of the National 
Banking Era and in the Great Depression.  During the national banking era, the 
suspension of cash payment by the local clearing houses (restrictions on the convertibility 
of bank deposits into cash) was usually capable of stopping the sequence of bank 
suspensions.  The connections between banks were through correspondent balances, 
interbank loans, or shared exposure to assets that trade in an external market. 
 The interdependence of these large firms threatened the solvency of other firms as 
well, which we defined as type two systemic risk, reflecting the risk that counterparties 
could fail and default on payment.  Too big to fail is a policy that addresses this risk and 
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captures this alleged network of interconnections among financial institutions.  It is 
decidedly different from type one systemic risk, and requires a full evaluation of the 
extenuating circumstances when the evidence on bank solvency is fully available. Policy 
prescriptions for type two systemic risk represent a radical departure from standard 
central bank remedies for banking panics.  There had been universal agreement that the 
remedy for earlier banking panics was to support only solvent banks.  Since it was no 
easy task to determine whether a bank was solvent or not, many insolvent banks came 
under the umbrella unintentionally.  “Too Big To Fail” implies support for insolvent 
banks or those threatened by insolvency.   
 The recent financial crisis lends support to the idea that counterparty exposures 
have increased, and that perhaps financial derivatives have magnified those counterparty 
exposures. Then, “too big to fail” is really an outcome of the rapid financial innovation 
and the willingness of LCFIs to expose each other to increased credit risk through the use 
of the financial derivatives.  The use of off balance sheet vehicle and complex financial 
products was a means of magnifying risk; the underlying source of the risk was that the 
LCFIs employed high leverage ratios and held assets that lost value rapidly.  
 What we have learned about banking crises in the US since the Civil War is how 
they differed from the current financial crisis, but it is more important to recognize that 
the “old school” remedies for those banking crises are not the relevant cure for the 
current crisis. Bagehot’s rules need some updating.  That does not mean, however, that 
the central bank refrain from injecting liquidity to forestall a loss of depositor confidence.  
Rather, we suggest that in the presence of “too big to fail” policies, managing type two 
systemic risk requires a new research agenda.  Our understanding of type two systemic 
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risk – interconnectedness and the transmission of insolvency -- is still in the early stage. 
And evidence to support the type two systemic risk hypothesis must await the availability 
of bank records (how insolvent were the LCFIs and LCNFIs?).   
 Our brief review of the panics of the National banking Era and the Great 
Depression supports our general description of type one systemic risk.  In the current 
crisis, there has been no general shock to depositor confidence, no widespread bank runs, 
no increase in hoarding, and no decline in measured money stock. There was, however, a 
tremendous shock to confidence in structured financial products and securitized assets 
more generally.  The collapse of the housing bubble was a shock to the solvency of 
certain large, complex non-depository financial institutions (LCNFIs) in the central 
money market (New York City) as well as some outside NYC.  In the current 
crisis systemic risk has been magnified by the existence of megabanks with more 
sophisticated and complex interconnections.  Fear of negative spillovers from a mega 
bank failure generates motives to forestall failure. The insolvency or threatened 
insolvency of a megabank has given rise to a new doctrine "too big to fail" or another 
way of putting it - excessive systemic risk.  The old doctrine that we described earlier --" 
let insolvent banks fail" prevailed during the national banking era and the Great 
Depression.  Restoring bank solvency today requires a markedly different solution for 
restoring liquidity. 
  
40 
 
Data Appendix 
Real GNP data, quarterly, from 1875 to 1940 are taken from Balke and Gordon (1987). 
Data for the following series: 
1) call loan interest rate 
2) the commercial paper rate 
3) the currency held by public 
4) adjusted demand deposits of commercial banks 
are taken from the NBER Macro History Database, listed in the references. 
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Appendix 1   National Banking Era Institutions 
 As in subsequent National Banking Era financial crises, the clunky structure of 
the banking system played a part in the haphazard response to a financial collapse.  That 
being said, the private market participants used a variety of procedures to take prompt 
and effective action to ameliorate the noxious effects of the financial crisis.  The primary 
assault on the financial market brought down the “investment-bank-like” brokerage 
houses first, and the most important ones failed in New York City.  The ensuing panic 
arose from a generalized fear that brokerage failures, stock market declines, interest rate 
spikes, and abrupt interruption in overall economic activity threatened the durable 
solvency of the banking system.  This source of the banking panic was an entirely 
reasonable assessment of the economic situation given recent past experiences (banking 
problems arose intermittently throughout the Civil War) and incomplete information 
about the solvency of banks.  The asymmetry of information between depositors and 
bankers has been an important idea in the explanation of banking panics.18  Depositors 
have no clear knowledge about the solvency of banks, and do not know the borrowers or 
the status of the loans on bank balance sheets.  Further, the depositors do not know for 
sure whether the failure of a railroad firm would have a material effect on the solvency of 
the bank.  Taken to the aggregate, depositors generally would not be able to determine 
whether the failure of railroad firms would threaten the solvency of the banking system.  
Given such a description, news about widespread railroad firm failures as well as the 
failures of other industrial firms would provide compelling reasons for depositors to 
withdraw his or her deposits from a bank and the banking system.  Also, a banking 
                                                 
18 See Calomiris and Gorton (1991) for a description of the asymmetric information approach to banking 
crises. 
42 
 
institution need not fail for depositors to spur a widespread desire to withdraw their 
deposits from the banking system. 
The modern solution to banking panics – credible deposit insurance and a reliable 
“official” lender of last resort -- was unavailable in 1873.  Further, there was also no 
central banking institution in operation in the United States, which has often been viewed 
as the glaring flaw in the design of the National Banking System.  As a result, there was 
no existing mechanism that allowed a rapid increase in the supply of base money – that 
is, currency, legal tender, and bank reserves.  In a banking panic, depositors generally 
demanded their deposits to be converted to cash; this action – a widespread 
transformation of deposits into currency, and/or legal tender – could not be satisfied.  The 
lack of a central bank, it was believed, prevented an orderly satisfaction of depositor 
withdrawal demands.  It was perceived that a central bank-like institution could 
potentially allow a bank to re-discount some of its assets with the central bank in 
exchange for currency, so that the bank could satisfy the withdrawal demands of its 
depositors.  In the absence of a central bank, the banking system was incapable of 
satisfying the withdrawal demands, and had to renege on its obligations to exchange 
deposits for currency (and legal tender).   
In New York City, the private association of banks – the New York Clearing 
House Association – engaged in two activities to alleviate the crisis.  The first technique 
was to implement restrictions on convertibility of deposits into cash; the restrictions were 
typically limits on withdrawals to dollar amounts, like $25 to $100 per week.  The 
restrictions limited the depletion of aggregate deposits (and especially, aggregate bank 
reserves).  The implementation of restrictions on convertibility required the cooperation 
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of all the banks in an area, so the effective dates for “restrictions” would align with the 
announcement by the New York Clearing House (NYCH) Association of such 
restrictions. Restrictions often led to a premium on cash relative to deposit balances, 
reflecting the excess demand for cash. 
Secondly, the NYCH association initiated the issuance of Clearing House Loan 
Certificates, which provided a temporary increase in the supply of currency and legal 
tender. 19  Member banks would offer collateral securities (and loans) to the Clearing 
House Loan Committee of the NYCH and the Clearing House Loan Committee would 
issue Clearing House Loan Certificates in the amount of 75 percent of the face value of 
the collateral.  The banks could then use the clearing house loan certificates among 
themselves as substitutes for cash and legal tender, thereby increasing the cash available 
to the public.  Despite the issuance of Clearing House Loan Certificates, the restrictions 
on convertibility (often referred to as “suspension of convertibility”) were also crucial for 
the attenuation of the financial distress, especially in the most serious crises.  It was 
important for the Clearing House to moderate the demands of depositors to remove their 
deposits from the banking system.  No fractional reserve banking system can exist if 
depositors pulled all their money out of the banking system (to dis-intermediate).  In fact, 
it was to become a “lost art” -- to implement such restrictions – after the creation of the 
Federal Reserve System in 1913, and the recent financial crisis raises questions about 
whether a modern equivalent of the “restrictions” would help moderate the downswings 
of asset prices during a financial crisis.   
Both elements – the restrictions on convertibility and the issuance of clearing 
                                                 
19 See Andrew 1908 and Cannon 1910 for more detail on the characteristics of clearing house loan 
certificates. See Tallman and Moen 2007 for details on issuance during the Panic of 1907. 
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house loan certificates – were important for the survival of the banking system.  There 
were additional actions, perhaps more subtle than the two key mechanisms, taken by the 
clearing house that further assuaged the Panic of 1873 in particular.  For one thing, the 
New York Clearing House withheld individual bank reports and instead issued only a 
statement of the aggregate balance sheet for the membership of the clearing house. This 
action prevented depositors from targeting banks that appeared to have weak balance 
sheet elements (for example, a low level of cash reserves, depleted capital base, small 
amount of high quality, low risk assets, etc.).  Secondly, the New York Clearing House 
pooled the remaining reserves of member banks.  This latter action was not repeated in 
the responses to subsequent financial crises of the National Banking Era.  The pooling of 
reserves (or “equalization” of reserves as discussed in Sprague 1910) allowed the largest 
national banks in New York City to continue delivering currency to its bank depositors 
from the interior of the country (Wicker 2000, page 31). 
New York City national banks were the key repository for the reserves of banks 
located in the interior of the country.  In fact, the largest seven national banks in New 
York City held 80 percent of interior bank reserve deposits.  These banks, therefore, also 
faced the risk of withdrawal by interior bank depositors, and the concentration of reserves 
in these seven banks became a risk for interior banks.  Sprague (1910) praised the New 
York Clearing House for its management of the Panic of 1873, as does Wicker (2000).  
The NYCH tried to satisfy the withdrawal demands of depositors (both bank and 
individual) and delayed imposing restrictions on convertibility of deposits into currency 
until its reserve levels, already far below legal/regulatory requirements, became 
dangerously close to any reasonable minimum.   
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 The aggregate amount of clearing house loan certificates issued was $27M; 
further aid came from the Treasury.  The Treasury bought $13 M in bonds and re-issued 
$26 M in greenbacks (legal tender notes).  Combining all forms of base money 
substitutes issued in 1873, the total amount of additional currency was around $67 M, 
which represented slightly more than 12 percent of the total stock of currency held by the 
public. 
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 Appendix 2 Systemic Risk 
  
 The financial sector performs two indispensible functions for the efficient 
operation of the macroeconomy: first, as a critical cog in the payments mechanism and 
second, as a chief intermediary in the savings-investment process.  Depositors facilitate 
the exchange of goods and services and credit facilitates the transfer of funds from 
surplus to deficit spending units. A financial crisis may be defined as a serious disruption 
in these dual functions.  
 Systemic risk attaches to the performance of both functions in the guise of loss of 
depositor confidence in the banks to pay on demand, and the loss of confidence of banks 
in each other.  A disruption of credit flows can contribute to the loss of confidence.  An 
over-leveraged mega bank with an inter-connected network to other banks and financial 
institutions when in difficulty can transmit fear and uncertainty to the entire network. The 
 
Type One Systemic Risk 
 
Loss of depositor confidence leads to 
widespread liquidation of deposits 
 
Spillover effects are external –  
 
Examples: 
 
Depositors at other banks infer that bank run 
implied problems at their bank 
 
To satisfy liquidity demands, a bank is 
forced to liquidate assets at “fire sale” prices 
 
Fire sale prices imply weakness in banks 
that hold assets in same market 
 
Type Two Systemic Risk 
 
Perceived risk that failure of large complex 
financial institution (LCFI) would generate huge 
losses at other LCFIs as a result 
 
Counterparty exposures between banks are large
 
Exposures may involve use of complex financial 
products that magnify losses (spillover effects 
through internal two party contracts) 
 
Failure of counterparty in Credit Default Swap 
may cause an LCFI to face huge losses because 
of a disappearance of a key hedge contract. 
 
Replacement of CDS in the market (during 
crisis) may not have been possible (or at a price 
that would imply insolvency) 
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“too big to fail” doctrine reflects the fear of allowing a large financial failure to magnify 
systemic risk. The collapse of a large bank may affect depositor confidence; the failure of 
Lehman Brothers was a recent case in point.20   
                                                 
20 Not all large bank failures produce a perception of in solvency that reflects a systemic problem.  
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have argued that the failure of one of the largest banks in New York City in 
December 1930 affected depositor confidence throughout the U.S..  But there were no direct effects on 
other banks either in the US or elsewhere. 
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